The existing CRYPTO_AES_CTR is the RFC 3686 profile: the last 4 bytes of
the key are a nonce, the IV is 8 bytes and only the low 32 bits of the
counter block are incremented. SSH aes128/192/256-ctr (RFC 4344) instead
uses the key as-is (no embedded nonce) and treats the whole 16-byte IV as
the initial counter block, incremented as a 128-bit big-endian integer,
with the first keystream block being E(IV).
Add CRYPTO_AES_CTR_SSH as a new enc_xform mirroring the CRYPTO_CHACHA20_DJB
addition. It reuses struct aes_ctr_ctx and the AES block; only setkey (full
key, no nonce), reinit (full 16-byte counter) and crypt (encrypt-then-
increment over all 16 bytes) differ from the RFC 3686 variant.
Keystream validated against `openssl enc -aes-128-ctr`, including a counter
that carries across byte boundaries and a non-block-aligned tail.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Moura <moura.fmo@gmail.com>
CRYPTO_CHACHA20 implements the RFC 8439/IETF parameterization (32-bit
counter + 96-bit nonce). SSH's chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com uses the
original DJB construction instead: a 64-bit block counter in state
words 12..13 and a 64-bit nonce in words 14..15 (libtomcrypt's
chacha_ivctr64). The two layouts produce different keystreams for the
same key, so an SSH server cannot interoperate with OpenSSH clients
through the IETF variant.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Moura <moura.fmo@gmail.com>
Expose the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD through
the OCF crypto framework (/dev/crypto) so applications such as an SSH
server (chacha20-poly1305) can use them directly, and fix the underlying
ChaCha nonce/counter layout so both match RFC 8439.
RFC 8439 nonce layout fix
-------------------------
chacha_ivsetup() previously used the original DJB layout: a 64-bit block
counter (input[12..13]) followed by a 64-bit nonce (input[14..15]). RFC
8439 defines a 32-bit block counter (input[12]) and a 96-bit / 12-byte
nonce (input[13..15]). With the old layout the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305
AEAD could not reproduce the RFC 8439 test vectors (the last 4 bytes of a
12-byte nonce were consumed as the high half of the counter). This
commit switches chacha_ivsetup() to the RFC 8439 layout and updates the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 one-shot helpers to pass a 12-byte nonce accordingly.
Standalone ChaCha20 on the unified enc path
-------------------------------------------
Instead of introducing a separate multi-buffer stream path (parallel
encrypt_multi/decrypt_multi callbacks), extend the existing enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt callback signature with a length argument:
void (*encrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
void (*decrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
With that single change every cipher, block or stream, flows through the
same swcr_encdec path. swcr_encdec already handles a short final block
via buflen = MIN(i, blocksize), so arbitrary-length data works without a
second code path. This is exactly how the existing stream ciphers
(AES-CTR/OFB/CFB) already behave: the cipher keeps its own counter in the
context and swcr_encdec feeds it whole blocks (only the last one may be
shorter). chacha20_crypt likewise relies on the underlying chacha state
block counter (input[12]) to continue the keystream across calls, so no
per-call keystream caching is needed.
* chacha_private.h: chacha_ivsetup uses a 4-byte counter and a 12-byte
nonce (RFC 8439).
* chachapoly.c / chachapoly.h: split reinit into chacha20_reinit (raw,
counter 0) and chachapoly_reinit (AEAD, counter 1); chacha20_crypt
takes a length and encrypts it in one pass, mirroring aes_ctr_crypt;
12-byte nonce for the one-shot AEAD helpers.
* xform.h / xform.c: add size_t len to encrypt/decrypt; add
enc_xform_chacha20 (blocksize 64, 12-byte IV).
* cryptodev.c / cryptosoft.c: register CRYPTO_CHACHA20 as a txform
cipher, route new sessions to enc_xform_chacha20, feed the AEAD AAD
through crp_aad/crp_aadlen, and handle the short final block in
swcr_encdec.
* cryptodev.h: add CRYPTO_CHACHA20; bump EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN to 64.
This keeps all ciphers on one uniform path instead of maintaining two,
and any future stream cipher drops in with just an xform table entry.
Impact: extends an internal kernel callback signature (enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt). All in-tree implementations are updated in the same
commit and the user-facing /dev/crypto ABI is unchanged, so this is
self-contained and not a breaking change for existing configurations.
Testing:
Build host: Ubuntu Linux x86_64, GCC (host sim toolchain)
Target: sim:crypto (CONFIG_ARCH=sim)
Ran the crypto test apps. ChaCha20 uses RFC 8439 2.4.2 vectors
(including a 375-byte multi-block vector exercising cross-block counter
continuity); ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses the RFC 8439 2.8.2 AEAD vector.
A full regression of the other ciphers was run to confirm the extended
encrypt/decrypt signature does not change their behaviour:
nsh> chacha20
chacha20: 2/2 vectors passed
nsh> chachapoly
OK test vector 0
chachapoly: 1/1 vectors passed
nsh> des3cbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aescbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesctr -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesxts -> 14 vectors OK (encrypt + decrypt)
nsh> hmac -> md5 / sha1 / sha256 all success
Signed-off-by: makejian <makejian@xiaomi.com>
Since already have support for SHA2-224, extend cryptodev/cryptosoft
to support HMAC version of SHA2-224.
Signed-off-by: Peter Barada <peter.barada@gmail.com>
Most tools used for compliance and SBOM generation use SPDX identifiers
This change brings us a step closer to an easy SBOM generation.
Signed-off-by: Alin Jerpelea <alin.jerpelea@sony.com>
public header files put into include/crpyto
private header/source files put into crpyto
crypto.c cryptodev.[c|h] cryptosoft.[c|h] come from:
commit id is f245bed2a7593bf0decce50caaed4ce05fefd6cf
the rest come from:
commit id is 61b0e532b2dce0a91cf3ea67d346645a61a88cdd
Signed-off-by: anjiahao <anjiahao@xiaomi.com>
