2022-07-27 19:51:53 +08:00
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/****************************************************************************
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* include/crypto/chachapoly.h
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2024-10-02 15:59:15 +02:00
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
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* SPDX-FileCopyrightText:2015 Mike Belopuhov
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2022-07-18 15:00:30 +08:00
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
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* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
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* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
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* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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****************************************************************************/
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2022-07-18 15:00:30 +08:00
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2022-07-27 19:51:53 +08:00
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#ifndef __INCLUDE_CRYPTO_CHACHAPOLY_H
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#define __INCLUDE_CRYPTO_CHACHAPOLY_H
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#define CHACHA20_KEYSIZE 32
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#define CHACHA20_CTR 4
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#define CHACHA20_SALT 4
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crypto: Add ChaCha20/ChaCha20-Poly1305 to /dev/crypto, fix RFC 8439 nonce.
Expose the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD through
the OCF crypto framework (/dev/crypto) so applications such as an SSH
server (chacha20-poly1305) can use them directly, and fix the underlying
ChaCha nonce/counter layout so both match RFC 8439.
RFC 8439 nonce layout fix
-------------------------
chacha_ivsetup() previously used the original DJB layout: a 64-bit block
counter (input[12..13]) followed by a 64-bit nonce (input[14..15]). RFC
8439 defines a 32-bit block counter (input[12]) and a 96-bit / 12-byte
nonce (input[13..15]). With the old layout the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305
AEAD could not reproduce the RFC 8439 test vectors (the last 4 bytes of a
12-byte nonce were consumed as the high half of the counter). This
commit switches chacha_ivsetup() to the RFC 8439 layout and updates the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 one-shot helpers to pass a 12-byte nonce accordingly.
Standalone ChaCha20 on the unified enc path
-------------------------------------------
Instead of introducing a separate multi-buffer stream path (parallel
encrypt_multi/decrypt_multi callbacks), extend the existing enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt callback signature with a length argument:
void (*encrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
void (*decrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
With that single change every cipher, block or stream, flows through the
same swcr_encdec path. swcr_encdec already handles a short final block
via buflen = MIN(i, blocksize), so arbitrary-length data works without a
second code path. This is exactly how the existing stream ciphers
(AES-CTR/OFB/CFB) already behave: the cipher keeps its own counter in the
context and swcr_encdec feeds it whole blocks (only the last one may be
shorter). chacha20_crypt likewise relies on the underlying chacha state
block counter (input[12]) to continue the keystream across calls, so no
per-call keystream caching is needed.
* chacha_private.h: chacha_ivsetup uses a 4-byte counter and a 12-byte
nonce (RFC 8439).
* chachapoly.c / chachapoly.h: split reinit into chacha20_reinit (raw,
counter 0) and chachapoly_reinit (AEAD, counter 1); chacha20_crypt
takes a length and encrypts it in one pass, mirroring aes_ctr_crypt;
12-byte nonce for the one-shot AEAD helpers.
* xform.h / xform.c: add size_t len to encrypt/decrypt; add
enc_xform_chacha20 (blocksize 64, 12-byte IV).
* cryptodev.c / cryptosoft.c: register CRYPTO_CHACHA20 as a txform
cipher, route new sessions to enc_xform_chacha20, feed the AEAD AAD
through crp_aad/crp_aadlen, and handle the short final block in
swcr_encdec.
* cryptodev.h: add CRYPTO_CHACHA20; bump EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN to 64.
This keeps all ciphers on one uniform path instead of maintaining two,
and any future stream cipher drops in with just an xform table entry.
Impact: extends an internal kernel callback signature (enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt). All in-tree implementations are updated in the same
commit and the user-facing /dev/crypto ABI is unchanged, so this is
self-contained and not a breaking change for existing configurations.
Testing:
Build host: Ubuntu Linux x86_64, GCC (host sim toolchain)
Target: sim:crypto (CONFIG_ARCH=sim)
Ran the crypto test apps. ChaCha20 uses RFC 8439 2.4.2 vectors
(including a 375-byte multi-block vector exercising cross-block counter
continuity); ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses the RFC 8439 2.8.2 AEAD vector.
A full regression of the other ciphers was run to confirm the extended
encrypt/decrypt signature does not change their behaviour:
nsh> chacha20
chacha20: 2/2 vectors passed
nsh> chachapoly
OK test vector 0
chachapoly: 1/1 vectors passed
nsh> des3cbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aescbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesctr -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesxts -> 14 vectors OK (encrypt + decrypt)
nsh> hmac -> md5 / sha1 / sha256 all success
Signed-off-by: makejian <makejian@xiaomi.com>
2026-07-10 14:13:58 +08:00
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#define CHACHA20_NONCE 4
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#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_LEN 64
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struct chacha20_ctx
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{
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uint8_t block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_LEN];
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uint8_t nonce[CHACHA20_NONCE];
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};
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int chacha20_setkey(FAR void *, FAR uint8_t *, int);
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void chacha20_reinit(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *);
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crypto: Add ChaCha20/ChaCha20-Poly1305 to /dev/crypto, fix RFC 8439 nonce.
Expose the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD through
the OCF crypto framework (/dev/crypto) so applications such as an SSH
server (chacha20-poly1305) can use them directly, and fix the underlying
ChaCha nonce/counter layout so both match RFC 8439.
RFC 8439 nonce layout fix
-------------------------
chacha_ivsetup() previously used the original DJB layout: a 64-bit block
counter (input[12..13]) followed by a 64-bit nonce (input[14..15]). RFC
8439 defines a 32-bit block counter (input[12]) and a 96-bit / 12-byte
nonce (input[13..15]). With the old layout the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305
AEAD could not reproduce the RFC 8439 test vectors (the last 4 bytes of a
12-byte nonce were consumed as the high half of the counter). This
commit switches chacha_ivsetup() to the RFC 8439 layout and updates the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 one-shot helpers to pass a 12-byte nonce accordingly.
Standalone ChaCha20 on the unified enc path
-------------------------------------------
Instead of introducing a separate multi-buffer stream path (parallel
encrypt_multi/decrypt_multi callbacks), extend the existing enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt callback signature with a length argument:
void (*encrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
void (*decrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
With that single change every cipher, block or stream, flows through the
same swcr_encdec path. swcr_encdec already handles a short final block
via buflen = MIN(i, blocksize), so arbitrary-length data works without a
second code path. This is exactly how the existing stream ciphers
(AES-CTR/OFB/CFB) already behave: the cipher keeps its own counter in the
context and swcr_encdec feeds it whole blocks (only the last one may be
shorter). chacha20_crypt likewise relies on the underlying chacha state
block counter (input[12]) to continue the keystream across calls, so no
per-call keystream caching is needed.
* chacha_private.h: chacha_ivsetup uses a 4-byte counter and a 12-byte
nonce (RFC 8439).
* chachapoly.c / chachapoly.h: split reinit into chacha20_reinit (raw,
counter 0) and chachapoly_reinit (AEAD, counter 1); chacha20_crypt
takes a length and encrypts it in one pass, mirroring aes_ctr_crypt;
12-byte nonce for the one-shot AEAD helpers.
* xform.h / xform.c: add size_t len to encrypt/decrypt; add
enc_xform_chacha20 (blocksize 64, 12-byte IV).
* cryptodev.c / cryptosoft.c: register CRYPTO_CHACHA20 as a txform
cipher, route new sessions to enc_xform_chacha20, feed the AEAD AAD
through crp_aad/crp_aadlen, and handle the short final block in
swcr_encdec.
* cryptodev.h: add CRYPTO_CHACHA20; bump EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN to 64.
This keeps all ciphers on one uniform path instead of maintaining two,
and any future stream cipher drops in with just an xform table entry.
Impact: extends an internal kernel callback signature (enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt). All in-tree implementations are updated in the same
commit and the user-facing /dev/crypto ABI is unchanged, so this is
self-contained and not a breaking change for existing configurations.
Testing:
Build host: Ubuntu Linux x86_64, GCC (host sim toolchain)
Target: sim:crypto (CONFIG_ARCH=sim)
Ran the crypto test apps. ChaCha20 uses RFC 8439 2.4.2 vectors
(including a 375-byte multi-block vector exercising cross-block counter
continuity); ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses the RFC 8439 2.8.2 AEAD vector.
A full regression of the other ciphers was run to confirm the extended
encrypt/decrypt signature does not change their behaviour:
nsh> chacha20
chacha20: 2/2 vectors passed
nsh> chachapoly
OK test vector 0
chachapoly: 1/1 vectors passed
nsh> des3cbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aescbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesctr -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesxts -> 14 vectors OK (encrypt + decrypt)
nsh> hmac -> md5 / sha1 / sha256 all success
Signed-off-by: makejian <makejian@xiaomi.com>
2026-07-10 14:13:58 +08:00
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void chacha20_crypt(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t);
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void chachapoly_reinit(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *);
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2026-07-10 18:48:43 -03:00
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int chacha20_djb_setkey(FAR void *, FAR uint8_t *, int);
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void chacha20_djb_reinit(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *);
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2022-07-18 15:00:30 +08:00
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crypto: Add ChaCha20/ChaCha20-Poly1305 to /dev/crypto, fix RFC 8439 nonce.
Expose the ChaCha20 stream cipher and the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD through
the OCF crypto framework (/dev/crypto) so applications such as an SSH
server (chacha20-poly1305) can use them directly, and fix the underlying
ChaCha nonce/counter layout so both match RFC 8439.
RFC 8439 nonce layout fix
-------------------------
chacha_ivsetup() previously used the original DJB layout: a 64-bit block
counter (input[12..13]) followed by a 64-bit nonce (input[14..15]). RFC
8439 defines a 32-bit block counter (input[12]) and a 96-bit / 12-byte
nonce (input[13..15]). With the old layout the existing ChaCha20-Poly1305
AEAD could not reproduce the RFC 8439 test vectors (the last 4 bytes of a
12-byte nonce were consumed as the high half of the counter). This
commit switches chacha_ivsetup() to the RFC 8439 layout and updates the
ChaCha20-Poly1305 one-shot helpers to pass a 12-byte nonce accordingly.
Standalone ChaCha20 on the unified enc path
-------------------------------------------
Instead of introducing a separate multi-buffer stream path (parallel
encrypt_multi/decrypt_multi callbacks), extend the existing enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt callback signature with a length argument:
void (*encrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
void (*decrypt)(caddr_t, FAR uint8_t *, size_t len);
With that single change every cipher, block or stream, flows through the
same swcr_encdec path. swcr_encdec already handles a short final block
via buflen = MIN(i, blocksize), so arbitrary-length data works without a
second code path. This is exactly how the existing stream ciphers
(AES-CTR/OFB/CFB) already behave: the cipher keeps its own counter in the
context and swcr_encdec feeds it whole blocks (only the last one may be
shorter). chacha20_crypt likewise relies on the underlying chacha state
block counter (input[12]) to continue the keystream across calls, so no
per-call keystream caching is needed.
* chacha_private.h: chacha_ivsetup uses a 4-byte counter and a 12-byte
nonce (RFC 8439).
* chachapoly.c / chachapoly.h: split reinit into chacha20_reinit (raw,
counter 0) and chachapoly_reinit (AEAD, counter 1); chacha20_crypt
takes a length and encrypts it in one pass, mirroring aes_ctr_crypt;
12-byte nonce for the one-shot AEAD helpers.
* xform.h / xform.c: add size_t len to encrypt/decrypt; add
enc_xform_chacha20 (blocksize 64, 12-byte IV).
* cryptodev.c / cryptosoft.c: register CRYPTO_CHACHA20 as a txform
cipher, route new sessions to enc_xform_chacha20, feed the AEAD AAD
through crp_aad/crp_aadlen, and handle the short final block in
swcr_encdec.
* cryptodev.h: add CRYPTO_CHACHA20; bump EALG_MAX_BLOCK_LEN to 64.
This keeps all ciphers on one uniform path instead of maintaining two,
and any future stream cipher drops in with just an xform table entry.
Impact: extends an internal kernel callback signature (enc_xform
encrypt/decrypt). All in-tree implementations are updated in the same
commit and the user-facing /dev/crypto ABI is unchanged, so this is
self-contained and not a breaking change for existing configurations.
Testing:
Build host: Ubuntu Linux x86_64, GCC (host sim toolchain)
Target: sim:crypto (CONFIG_ARCH=sim)
Ran the crypto test apps. ChaCha20 uses RFC 8439 2.4.2 vectors
(including a 375-byte multi-block vector exercising cross-block counter
continuity); ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses the RFC 8439 2.8.2 AEAD vector.
A full regression of the other ciphers was run to confirm the extended
encrypt/decrypt signature does not change their behaviour:
nsh> chacha20
chacha20: 2/2 vectors passed
nsh> chachapoly
OK test vector 0
chachapoly: 1/1 vectors passed
nsh> des3cbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aescbc -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesctr -> all vectors OK
nsh> aesxts -> 14 vectors OK (encrypt + decrypt)
nsh> hmac -> md5 / sha1 / sha256 all success
Signed-off-by: makejian <makejian@xiaomi.com>
2026-07-10 14:13:58 +08:00
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#define POLY1305_KEYLEN 64
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#define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16
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#define POLY1305_BLOCK_LEN 16
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struct poly1305_ctx
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{
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/* r, h, pad, leftover */
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unsigned long state[5 + 5 + 4];
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size_t leftover;
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unsigned char buffer[POLY1305_BLOCK_LEN];
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unsigned char final;
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};
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typedef struct
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{
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uint8_t key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
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/* counter, salt */
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uint8_t nonce[CHACHA20_NONCE];
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struct chacha20_ctx chacha;
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struct poly1305_ctx poly;
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}
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CHACHA20_POLY1305_CTX;
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void chacha20_poly1305_init(FAR void *);
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void chacha20_poly1305_setkey(FAR void *, FAR const uint8_t *, uint16_t);
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void chacha20_poly1305_reinit(FAR void *, FAR const uint8_t *, uint16_t);
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int chacha20_poly1305_update(FAR void *, FAR const uint8_t *, size_t);
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void chacha20_poly1305_final(FAR uint8_t *, FAR void *);
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/* WireGuard crypto */
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#define CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE CHACHA20_KEYSIZE
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#define CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE POLY1305_TAGLEN
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#define XCHACHA20POLY1305_NONCE_SIZE 24
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void chacha20poly1305_encrypt(
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FAR uint8_t *, FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t, const uint64_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *);
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int chacha20poly1305_decrypt(
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FAR uint8_t *, FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t, const uint64_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *);
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void xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(
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FAR uint8_t *, FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *,
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FAR const uint8_t *);
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int xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(
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FAR uint8_t *, FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *, const size_t,
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FAR const uint8_t *,
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FAR const uint8_t *);
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#endif /* __INCLUDE_CRYPTO_CHACHAPOLY_H */
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